Read e-book online Chiasms: Merleau-Ponty's Notion of Flesh (S U N Y Series in PDF

By Fred Evans, Leonard Lawlor

ISBN-10: 0791446859

ISBN-13: 9780791446850

Major students discover the later considered Merleau-Ponty and its primary position within the modernism-postmodernism debate. the very best interpretations and reviews of Merleau-Ponty's cutting edge notions of chiasm and flesh are provided right here by way of well-liked students from the us and Europe. Divided into 3 sections, the publication first establishes the concept of the flesh as a constant notion and unfolds the nuances of flesh that make it a compelling inspiration. the second one part provides to the strength of this concept by way of exhibiting how flesh should be prolonged to phenomena that Merleau-Ponty was once unable to regard, akin to the net and digital truth, and the 3rd bargains criticisms of Merleau-Ponty from feminist and Levinasian issues of view. all of the essays attest to the fecundity of Merleau-Ponty's later idea for such primary philosophical matters because the bonds among self, others, and the realm.

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Extra resources for Chiasms: Merleau-Ponty's Notion of Flesh (S U N Y Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy)

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Perception gives itself an author and understands itself as an activity of consciousness, even though it is merely the emergence of a percipere at the center of the percipi, even though perception is born only out of that attachment to Being which makes it possible. A reflection, which wants to be radical, therefore, should not ignore the blind spot of the mind (VI 55/33). But, for Merleau-Ponty, acknowledging its existence cannot mean fusion and coincidence with the origin of vision. That by which everything begins, “nature” or “the originary,” is not behind us in a past into which one would have to go in order to rejoin the origin; rather it lies in the écart of the present from this past, in the écart that is the space of our whole experience (VI 165/124.

Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 4, 76–77, 106; see also Deleuze, Foucault, pp. 83, 71. 17. Deleuze, What Is Philosophy? p. 75. 18. It operates within the institution of organic discourse, a type of discourse that seeks to understand the aspects of a phenomenon in terms of a whole that at least partially determines the presence or sense of these aspects; this type of discourse or institution is opposed to analytic discourse, which attempts to understand the same phenomenon in terms of elements that are related causally or in some external fashion.

BEING AND THE FLESH Merleau-Ponty does not, however, intend to complete the philosophy of consciousness by adding some things to it, namely, the phenomenon of the body on the side of the subject and the world as field and as horizonal structure on the side of the object. What is at issue is not the need to take account of the contingent fact of a perception that might just as easily have not taken place, nor is what is at issue the unmotivated sudden appearance of a for-itself that the in-itself does not need in order to be.

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Chiasms: Merleau-Ponty's Notion of Flesh (S U N Y Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy) by Fred Evans, Leonard Lawlor


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